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The rationale of the instant case is clearly correct and in accord
with most of the recent discussions and legislative adoptions. It main-
tains the simplicity of the Massachusetts rule and should be of vast
precedential importance in jurisdictions not having the Uniform
Revised Principal and Income Act. Other possible effects of this de-
cision are (1) a decrease in frequency of investment by trustees in
mutual funds"9 or (2) a reduction of trustee's management fees in
accordance with the extent to which he delegates his management
duties by investment in such funds."0 Texas has adopted the Uniform
Principal and Income Act, but it qualifies section 5, which states
that "all dividends payable otherwise than in the shares of the cor-
poration itself ...shall be deemed income," by adding "unless the
declaring corporation designates the source thereof as capital assets
of the declaring corporation."'" It remains to be seen whether desig-
nation as "capital gains divided" will be considered tantamount to a
declaration of "capital asset" derivation." It appears certain that the
rule of the instant case will be employed almost uniformly, either
statutorily or judicially, and the case itself should be highly in-
fluential in the latter respect.
David G. McLane
Parties to Crime in Texas - Principal or Accomplice
A Harris County probate judge authorized an administrator's fee
of 10,000 dollars to be paid from the funds of the estate. Subsequent
to the completion of this act and later on the same day, the admin-
istrator withdrew the money from the estate. The administrator
retained 5,000 dollars and, pursuant to a prearranged conspiracy,
deposited the remaining 5,000 dollars in the judge's private bank
account. The probate judge was convicted as a principal to the
crime of conversion of an estate. On rehearing, held: A party is a
principal to a crime, even though he neither is present at the time of
4 See note 41 supra and accompanying text.
50 See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
"1Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7425b-29(A) (1960).
"Because Texas, by Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 7425b-48 (1960), allows investment
in common trust funds even though not expressly authorized by the trust instrument, and
because this modified version of the original Uniform Principal and Income Act was en-
acted, the rationale of the instant case in all probability will be accepted in this state. The
latter enactment probably will be applied in the mutual fund situation, distributions being
treated as the result of sales of capital assets. This rule also should be influential regarding
the determination of community or separate property in mutual fund distributions, a situa-
tion in which an analogy is often drawn to trust allocations.
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the execution of the criminal act nor does anything in furtherance of
the offense at the time it is committed, if he authorized the means by
which the crime is perpetrated.' McClelland v. State, - Tex. Crim.
-, 373 S.W.2d 674 (1963).
The theory of principals and accomplices to a crime is an ancient
one. It was established firmly in England by the reign of Henry VII,
circa 1500.' Although the origin of the concept is shrouded in
antiquity, apparently the distinction arose in an attempt to mitigate
the harsh penalties of the old English criminal law.' Despite the hazy
historical background surrounding the evolution of the doctrine,
there is no doubt that the technical distinctions of the primitive
English common law are the source of the Texas Penal Code pro-
visions governing principals and accomplices.4 The Texas law, con-
trary to the vast majority of the modern criminal codes,' still pre-
serves this archaic concept s In the landmark case of Middleton v.
State," the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, cognizant that the
decisive factor controlling the distinction between parties to crime
is the acts of the accused at the time of the commission of the offense,'
set forth six classic examples of parties who would be considered
principal offenders.! The basic rule to be derived from these illustra-
1 Although it was held on rehearing that the judge was a principal, the case was re-
versed because of the admission of prejudicial evidence concerning extraneous transactions
which had no bearing upon the issues in the trial.
' 3 Holdsworth, A History of English Law 309 (1923).
3Id. at 308; 2 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 234 (1883).
'Morrison & Blackburn, The Law of Principals, Accomplices, and Accessories Under
the Texas Statutes, I Tex. Pen. Code Ann. XIII (1952). The Texas statute, however, recog-
nizes only one degree of principal and accomplice, whereas the traditional common law
recognized two degrees of principals and an accessory before the fact (accomplice in Texas).
The common law also developed the concept of an accessory after the fact, which in Texas
is called simply an accessory. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 65 (1952). See generally, Perkins,
Criminal Law 555 (1957).
' Morrison & Blackburn, supra note 4.
6Tex. Pen. Code Ann. arts. 65-72 (1952).
786 Tex. Crim. 307, 217 S.W. 1046 (1919).
Bean v. State, 17 Tex. Crim. 60 (1884).
The situations set forth by the court arise when:
(1) A actually commits the offense, but B is present, knows the unlawful
intent, and aids by acts or encourages by words.
(2) A actually commits the offense, but B keeps watch so as to prevent the
interruption of A.
(3) A actually executes the unlawful act, and B engages in procuring aid,
arms, or means of any kind to assist while A executes said unlawful act.
(4) A actually commits the offense, but B at the time of such commission
is endeavoring to secure the safety or concealment of A, or of A and B.
(5) A employs an innocent agent, or by indirect means causes the injury,
or brings about the commission of the offense.
(6) A advises or agrees to the commission of the offense and is present when
the same is committed, whether actually participating or not.
Johnson v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 192, 206 S.W.2d 605, 607 (1947) added one further
situation. A party is a principal in a theft case if, pursuant to a prior agreement, his part
in the conspiracy is to dispose of the property among the coconspirators after the property
is stolen.
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tions appears to be quite simple. A principal, whether present or not,
does something in furtherance of the common design at the time the
offense is committed;10 an accomplice, on the other hand, though
having advised or agreed to the commission of the crime, is not pres-
ent at the time of the execution of the crime and is not acting in
furtherance of a common design.11 Application of this doctrine, how-
ever, is extremely difficult and often leads to perplexing problems.
Although principals and accomplices are subject to identical pun-
ishment in Texas, 2 the distinction between the two actually hinders
the enforcement of justice because of the traditional rule that an
accused may be convicted only of the crime for which he is indicted."
Therefore, in the instant case, if the court had held that the accused
probate judge was an accomplice, the conviction would have been
reversed on this ground and the state would have been required to
bring charges under a fresh indictment. Thus, the technical distinc-
tion between principals and accomplices, far from being a moot his-
torical point, presents an intricate problem to virtually every case
involving multiple parties.
Application of the distinction between principals and accomplices
involves generally two categories of cases. One group usually will
include cases in which the time of the perpetration of the crime is
easily identified, e.g., robbery, 4 murder,"5 and other offenses in which
a single act completes the offense; in the other category of cases the
time of commission of the crime is pinpointed only with great diffi-
culty, e.g., swindling,M embezzlement, 7 and various types of con-
tinuing conspiracies." The former class of cases is exemplified best
by the situation in which the accused, in accordance with a previously
formed design, waits in a getaway car while his companion commits
the offense.0 In such circumstances, the accused, although not phy-
" Serrato v. State, 74 Tex. Crim. 413, 171 S.W. 1133 (1914).
"Ibid. Another often quoted definition of an accomplice is found in Cook v. State,
14 Tex. Crim. 96, 101 (1883), where it is stated that "the acts constituting an accomplice
are auxiliaries only, all of which may be and are performed by him anterior and as induce-
ments to the crime about to be committed ....
'"Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 72 (1952).
"Simms v. State, 10 Tex. Crim. 131, 159 (1881). The case uses the following language:
"[T]he rule [is] . . . well settled that when a party is charged as a principal offender
he cannot, under the Code of this State, be convicted as an accomplice, nor vice versa."
See McKeen v. State, 7 Tex. Crim. 631 (1880).
14Gonzales v. State, 171 Tex. Crim. 373, 350 S.W.2d 553 (1961); Stubblefield v. State,
169 Tex. Crim. 350, 334 S.W.2d 150 (1960); White v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 489, 228
S.W.2d 165 (1950); Hill v. State, 135 Tex. Crim. 567, 121 S.W.2d 996 (1938).
"Gonzales v. State, note 14 supra; Stubblefield v. State, note 14 supra; White v. State,
note 14 supra.
"6West v. State, 140 Tex. Crim. 493, 145 S.W.2d 580 (1940).
"Parnell v. State, 170 Tex. Crim. 30, 339 S.W.2d 49 (1959).
'"Holt v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 62, 160 S.W.2d 944 (1942).
"9 See cases cited in note 15 supra.
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sically present at the place where the crime is committed, is a prin-
cipal offender since he acts in furtherance of a common design at the
time of the commission of the offense. In these single act cases, how-
ever, if the accused completes all acts prior to the perpetration of
the crime, and is not present at the commission of the crime, he is
an accomplice to the offense."0 Therefore, if it is clear what act
constitutes the commission of the offense, attention is directed solely
at the behavior of the accused at the time of the execution of that
act in order to determine whether the accused is a principal or an
accomplice.
The antithesis of the single act situation is the continuing con-
spiracy crime in which determination of whether one is a principal
or an accomplice often produces complex issues. Here the area of
inquiry is broader in scope because of the difficulties encountered in
determining precisely when the offense was committed. Moreover,
confusion has developed in the law as a result of the early case of
Smith v. State, in which the Court of Criminal Appeals complicated
the doctrine of parties to crime by holding that "they are all prin-
cipals and acting together as long as any portion or object of the
common design remains incomplete; in other words, until the full
purpose and object of the conspiracy is consummated and accom-
plished."' 1 This deviation has gained added thrust under the current
"chain of causation" or "necessary part" theory."2 The rationale of
such a theory is that if the party charged does any act in the chain
of causation which leads up to the offense and which is a necessary
part of its accomplishment, he is a principal offender even though he
is not present at the time the offense actually is committed.' Applica-
tion of this theory in the instant case resulted in the holding on
rehearing that the accused probate judge was guilty as a principal.
The task of determining whether a party is a principal or an ac-
complice is brought into acute focus by the instant case. Even a
casual reading of the conflicting opinions of the various judges as to
the disposition of the case reveals the disorder of the law in this area."
'o Such a condition exists, for example, when the accused furnishes a car and advises
and encourages his coconspirators to steal, but does nothing in furtherance of the crime
when the theft is actually committed. Anzualda v. State, 115 Tex. Crim. 509, 27 S.W.2d
231 (1930).
2121 Tex. Crim. 107, 17 S.W. 552, 555 (1886).
22Holt v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 62, 160 S.W.2d 944 (1942); Bass v. State, 59 Tex.
Crim. 186, 127 S.W. 1020 (1910).
21 Cases cited note 22 supra.
"4In the original opinion the majority of the court viewed the accused judge as an ac-
complice because he was not present when the crime was committed and all of his acts
had been performed prior to the commission of the offense. In a concurring opinion. Judge
Morrison stated that the Holt case, supra note 22, had no application because the defendant
in that case was actually doing something when the offense was committed. 373 S.W.2d at
1964]
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As Judge Woodley observes in his dissent upon rehearing, the de-
cision will be of little value as a legal precedent because of the dis-
agreement among the judges. However, the case illustrates the con-
fusion that has resulted from the application of the "chain of
causation" doctrine. In order to clarify the concept of parties to
crime in Texas law, three crucially important questions should be
posed in each case to determine whether the accused is a principal
or an accomplice: (1) What act constituted the crime? (2) What
was the accused doing when the crime was committed? (3) Did the
accused's act constitute part of the crime? If upon answering these
questions, the accused fits into the traditional definitive requirements
of a principal, he should be so held. Application of the above ques-
tions to the instant case results in the following analysis. A crime
was not committed until the money was withdrawn from the estate's
bank account. When the crime was committed the accused judge's
act (signing the application) already had been completed, and he
was not present when the offense was committed. Therefore, the
accused's act was anterior to the execution of the crime. The con-
clusion should be that the accused judge was merely an accomplice
rather than a principal offender. Thus, as long as Texas continues
to maintain a distinction between principals and accomplices, utiliza-
tion of such an analysis, and consequent exclusion of the "chain of
causation" doctrine, should alleviate the existing disarray in this area
of the law.
Actually, retention of the traditional common law doctrine gov-
erning principals and accomplices is completely unwarranted in Texas
law primarily for the reason that both parties receive the same punish-
ment." This outmoded, antiquated theory has been under inter-
mittent attack by Texas jurists for some time. Possibly the earliest
assault upon the doctrine was Judge Hurt's realistic observation of
more than a half-century ago that the distinction is "without founda-
tion either in natural reason or the ordinary doctrine of law,"'.6 and
678. In a strong dissent, Judge Woodley stated that the judge was "present" because the
offense was not committed by a single act and the parties were acting together in the
commission of the crime. To support this contention he relied upon Parnell v. State, 170
Tex. Crim. 30, 339 S.W.2d 49 (1959). He also indicated that the Holt case was applicable
under the present facts. 373 S.W.2d at 678. On rehearing, Judge McDonald stated that the
Holt case was controlling and that the accused judge was guilty as a principal. 373 S.W.2d
at 681. Judge Morrison continued to view the judge as an accomplice, 373 S.W.2d at 685,
and Judge Woodley evidently still believed the Parnell case to be controlling. 373 S.W.2d at
686.6 Tex. Pen. Code Ann. art. 72 (1952).
" Carlisle v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 537, 21 S.W. 358, 359 (1893). In a detailed opinion,
Judge Hurt stated the reasons why the doctrine of parties is useless to the enforcement of
criminal law in Texas. The opinion is a succinctly stated legal analysis which calls for the
abolishment of the doctrine.
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